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At Long Last,  
the EU Takes on its Banks
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Five years have elapsed since the collapse of 
the banking sector in the US triggered the fi-
nancial crisis. It has caused a lot of despair ob-
serving that the European heads of state and 
government decided to bring the banks to heel 
only after the looming implosion of Spain’s 
banking sector in June 2012. Indeed, it is im-
possible to overlook the causative and harmful 
role that the banks played and continue to play 
in the crisis. The debts of the eurozone banks 
are three times higher than the sovereign debt 
of all of the eurozone countries taken together. 
In 2008 alone, Germany propped up its banks 
by taking over guarantees worth €480 billion.
Make no mistake, the European banking prob-
lem is just as much a home-grown affair as is 
sovereign debt. From the 1980s onwards and in 
expectation of higher growth rates policymak-
ers significantly deregulated the financial mar-
kets. As a result, banks became involved in in-
creasingly risky activities that were not subject 
to government supervision. Academic research 
has convincingly demonstrated the connection 
between deregulation and the financial crisis. 
The studies provide proof that in the aftermath 
of the Lehman crash in 2008 and 2009 poor 
economic performance in any given country 
was directly linked to poor government super-
vision of the banking sector. 
There can be no doubt that what happened in 
Spain, as well as in Ireland, illustrates that the 
eurozone’s financial stability is endangered not 
only by excessive indebtedness of the mem-
ber states, but also – and perhaps to an even 
greater extent – by bad loans on the books of 
European banks. Government bonds and banks 
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The agreement on establishing a common banking authority is paving 
the way for a banking union. The decision was reached by the finance 
ministers only hours before last December’s EU summit. After making 
headway on sovereign debt by deciding on a fiscal union one year be-
forehand in December 2011, the EU is by now also addressing the bank-
ing crisis and we know at least who is going to supervise who and what.2
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run into the billions. This reveals the political 
dynamite inherent in a European banking un-
ion based on the notion of joint and several li-
ability. And the costs attached are the reason 
why there were such tough negotiations before 
eventually an agreement could be reached on 
who will be in charge of a new European bank-
ing supervision authority.
Who supervises?
The ECB has been entrusted with supervising 
the banks in the eurozone as well as non-eu-
rozone banks that want to join the SSM. This 
was contentious until the very end. There had 
already been heated debates in autumn 2012, 
shortly after the Commission published its first 
proposal. It was the European Council’s high-
est legal advisor who rejected the idea that the 
Commission’s legislation could be implemented 
without amending the treaties. There are two 
now form a vicious circle. The ailing banks 
drive up government debt, whereas financially 
weak states are very burdensome for the banks 
since their bonds are practically worthless. It 
is exactly this kind of interdependence that the 
banking union will try to break.
What does the banking  
authority actually do?
The creation of a single supervisory mecha-
nism (SSM) with unlimited powers to discipline 
member states means that the EU is bringing 
an end to another chapter in the history of pet-
ty European polities. A distinct feature of the 
euro crisis has been that national supervisory 
authorities have played down the problems of 
their banks and, even if they are fully cognizant 
of the facts, protected their national “champi-
ons” to the detriment of others. The Spanish 
local banks, or cajas, are an excellent example. 
Without being prevented from doing so by the 
Spanish government, they financed a massive 
building boom in Spain even though they were 
significantly undercapitalized. That was until 
the property bubble burst. Their credit losses 
in this sector not only brought the Spanish gov-
ernment to its knees, but mushroomed to be-
come a European problem.
This also demonstrates that in an economic and 
monetary union the impact of misdemeanours 
or mistakes made in the banking sector of one 
member state can no longer be restricted to 
that particular country. They impact on other 
member states, and may even endanger the 
very existence of the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). This is why there is a 
need for a single set of criteria for the super-
vision of banks, and for a better and above all 
independent kind of supervisory body which 
can insist on closing down ailing banks – even 
when this defies the wishes of policymakers. 
Only if such a regime is put in place we can 
expect that developments as we  witnessed in 
the Spanish and Irish banking sector will not 
recur in the future. Nevertheless, in the current 
crisis taxpayers will have to foot the bill. The 
restructuring and closing down of banks can-
not be done for nothing – and the losses could 
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reasons why what at first sight seems to be no 
more than legal quibbling should actually be 
taken seriously. First, the ECB has been given 
a mandate that is based solely on an article in 
the treaty that was not originally designed for 
this purpose. Thus the federalization of the 
bank supervisory system, though an undeni-
able necessity, is once again something being 
pushed through without consulting the EU citi-
zenry. This is of course a practical way of doing 
things when there is a crisis since the process 
of amending a treaty, as the Lisbon Treaty de-
bacle demonstrated, is time-consuming and its 
outcome unpredictable. But a trick of this kind 
merely adds to the legitimacy deficit of the EU, 
which is moving ahead with integration with-
out the participation of its citizens.
Second, as soon as the ECB has been granted 
the powers to close down banks in member 
states, the ECB will encroach on property 
rights and take decisions that impinge on na-
tional budgets. As a result and in order to up-
hold the fundamental tenets of democracy and 
of the rule of law, the ECB will have to be su-
pervised by governments, parliaments, and the 
courts. For this reason there are fears that if 
the ECB is accountable to the member states in 
the area of banking supervision, its independ-
ence might be undermined when it comes to 
monetary policy.
More than any other country, Germany has 
always championed the idea of a central bank 
beyond the reach of politicians. In the negotia-
tions, it sought to strictly separate the ECB’s 
monetary policy mandate from the envisioned 
new banking supervision mandate. German 
Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble called for 
nothing less than the construction of a “Chi-
nese Wall” to separate the two. It remains to be 
seen whether the newly created ECB superviso-
ry committee will be a bulwark of this kind. In 
addition to representatives of the participating 
member states, four ECB members will have a 
seat and the right to vote. The barrier between 
monetary policy and supervision might thus 
be high, but permeable. Furthermore, doubts 
were raised about the quality of the decisions 
of the supervisory committee in lieu of the fact 
that the ECB cannot be given instructions by 
member states.
As far as Germany is concerned, the rejection of 
its proposals to weight the votes in the supervi-
sory committee in accordance with the liability 
size may turn out to be an even greater prob-
lem. As is the case in the ECB, every country 
no matter how large or how small has one vote. 
Decisions are taken on the basis of simple ma-
jority voting.
But the ECB is also faced with conflicts of inter-
est in other areas. In the euro crisis it has inter-
preted its monetary mandate rather generously 
by loosening the rules governing the collateral 
that banks have to pledge when they borrow. 
In addition, the ECB has made it possible for 
illiquid banks to gain access to long-term re-
financing operations – so-called LTROs. Many 
“zombie banks” were thus enabled to stay afloat 
in the markets. To liquidate these banks, which 
is what needs to be done, will probably not be 
European Banking 
Supervision
© Bertelsmann Stiftung
ECB
supervises
Audit balance sheets
Impose fines
Recapitalize banks 
Close down banks
Empowered to issue
instructions to indivi-
dual banks if national 
supervisory authorities 
fail to act
-  17 eurozone member states
-  4 ECB representatives
-  + (other EU member states)
Board of Supervisors:
About 200-300 banks
with a balance sheet total of more then €30 billion 
or 20% of GDP are directly supervised by the 
European Banking Authority.
6,000 banks in 17 eurozone countries
National
supervisory
authorities4
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sion. Initial estimates suggest that the regula-
tions will apply to about 200 to 300 banks, and 
at least three banks in every eurozone country 
come under ECB supervision.
However, part of the compromise is an excep-
tion clause, which could lead to total ECB su-
pervision via the back door. It specifies that 
at the first sign of trouble the ECB may also 
intervene in the case of small financial insti-
tutions. This would certainly make sense. Af-
ter all, in Spain the problems were caused by 
many small banks. And when it comes down to 
it, the German savings banks and the regional 
“Landesbanken,” which made serious errors of 
judgement with regard to the securitization of 
mortgages, are not as virtuous as they would 
like people to believe.
The fact that the ECB is empowered to inter-
vene in the case of banks below the €30 bil-
lion threshold means that there are bound to 
be questions about how it will interact with 
the existing national banking authorities. Can 
the ECB act like a superior authority and issue 
specific instructions? Or is it merely permitted 
to issue “general instructions”? (This is what 
Schäuble maintained when meeting the press 
after the agreement was reached on December 
13, 2012.) Obviously, the final word on this has 
not been spoken. The fact that the finance min-
isters have taken the precaution of setting up a 
mediation panel for potential conflicts between 
the ECB and the national banking authorities 
can be seen as an indication of this.
What about the eurozone 
"outs"?
For a long time the non-eurozone states were 
also opposed to task the ECB with the supervi-
sion of the banking sector. After all, they are 
not represented on its committees. Above all, 
they feared that with the establishment of a 
banking union eurozone members could domi-
nate decisions relating to the free movement 
of capital in the internal market. These fears 
were further amplified by Christian Noyer, Gov-
ernor of the Banque de France and a member 
of the ECB executive board, when he suggested 
easy for the ECB given this record. Losses for 
the ECB seem to be unavoidable. 
Who is being supervised?
The question of which and how many banks the 
ECB will supervise was a contentious issue up 
to the very end of the negotiations. The Com-
mission’s original proposals, which received 
the support of France, referred to all of the 
6,000 or so banks in the eurozone. In view of 
time and staff requirements, this did not really 
seem to be a feasible idea. Moreover, it immedi-
ately conjured up fears of a new and monstrous 
bureaucracy. There was also criticism of the 
fact that the ECB has no experience supervis-
ing banks or terminating their activities.
Opposition to all-embracing supervisory pow-
ers emerged in various areas. It was especially 
fierce in the case of the savings, cooperative 
and mutual savings banks that constitute the 
largest part of Germany’s banking sector. The 
stumbling block was the proposed European 
deposit insurance system to which all the eu-
rozone banks were going to have to contribute. 
An unusual feature of the savings and coopera-
tive banks is that they already have a deposit 
insurance organization that will, if necessary, 
cover payment defaults by one of its members. 
Those at the head of the German saving banks 
have made it clear that they reject the idea of 
sharing their emergency reserves with other 
banks. They obviously believe that once under 
ECB supervision the next thing that will hap-
pen is the mutualisation of their reserve funds.
The German government did not have much of 
a choice in the matter. In Germany it is impossi-
ble to pursue policies that go against the wish-
es of the savings banks. Thus, it took a long 
time to reach a compromise. A middle ground 
was found in that only system-relevant banks 
will be directly under the single supervision of 
the ECB. Banks are deemed system-relevant if 
they have a balance sheet total amounting to 
more than €30 billion or if it amounts to more 
than 20 percent of the economic power of their 
homeland. This means that all of the German 
savings banks are excluded, whereas almost all 
French banks will be under direct ECB supervi-5
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that for liquidity reasons the majority of euro-
based transactions should no longer take place 
in London, but within the eurozone. This was 
certainly not calculated to dispel British reser-
vations about the banking union.
The new supervisory board is designed to address 
such fears. EU member states are entitled to be 
represented on this committee; every EU member 
state that joins the banking union will receive a 
seat and have the right to vote. This though was 
not enough for Sweden and the Czech Republic 
that declared that they will not be joining the 
banking union for the foreseeable future.
In the end, the resistance put up by the “outs” 
was rather muted. Britain knows that it cannot 
prevent the move to more integration, which 
is the way the eurozone states are correcting 
the design faults in the EMU and are hoping to 
overcome the euro crisis. For this reason, pro-
posals to upgrade the European Banking Au-
thority (EBA), which is located in London, were 
quickly dropped.
In point of fact, this authority was set up in 
2010 together with three other supervisory 
authorities in order to improve the quality of 
financial supervision in the EU. However the 
EBA has not been an unqualified success. All 
but eight of the 91 financial institutions that 
were subjected to the bank stress test in 2011 
received a clean bill of health. This clearly did 
not reflect the realities of the market and was 
not a significant contribution to confidence-
building. As part of the new approach, the EBA 
is taking over the task of developing a “single 
rulebook” by the middle of 2013. Thereafter it 
will supervise implementation of the new regu-
lations in the member states.
In order to dispel anxieties about a two-speed 
Europe, the British government has insisted on 
changes in EBA voting regulations. The idea is 
to make it impossible for the eurozone coun-
tries to vote as a bloc and to prevent them from 
dominating the authority’s decision-making. 
For this reason, all decisions will in the future 
be taken on the basis of a double majority of 
the eurozone and non-eurozone states. Howev-
er, it seems that the ECB Council will continue 
to be able to overrule such decisions.
What still needs to be done?
 
The eurozone must not stop short at banking 
supervision, and should soon introduce a sin-
gle bank closure mechanism and a European 
deposit insurance system. Supervision is a 
good idea, but is not much good when it comes 
to resolving the crisis, especially if the liquida-
tion of banks continues to be the responsibility 
of the national authorities. Crises will continue 
to crop up, even if all of the eurozone members 
suddenly behave like paragons of virtue.
There are those who may be irritated by the 
fact that the US is actually a shining example 
of how things ought to be done. Indeed, in its 
approach to resolving the banking crisis the US 
has shown the Europeans that a truly integrated 
banking market is of paramount importance for 
the stability of a common monetary area. Dan-
iel Gros of CEPS, the Brussels-based think tank, 
has demonstrated this quite clearly in a com-
parison between Nevada and Ireland. The two 
entities, which are roughly the same size, were 
severely impacted by the wave of bankruptcies 
that hit the property market in 2008. In Nevada, 
despite numerous bank insolvencies and a 30% 
decline in gross national product, the local 
banking market did not grind to a standstill. Ire-
land, on the other hand, first had to bail out its 
banks and then had to be bailed out by the EU.
Why is it that the State of Nevada did not go 
down with its banks? Clearly what made the 
difference in the US is the federal banking sys-
tem, which means that risks are widely distrib-
uted. Furthermore, the large deposit insurance 
systems such as the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), which redistributes losses 
and provides compensation, provide an ad-
ditional safeguard. At the same time there is 
a kind of private banking union in the United 
States. Thus financial institutions that operate 
in a state of the union other than the one in 
which they are incorporated can deduct loss-
es incurred in this state from profits made in 
other states. It has never been possible to do 
this in the EU, and as a result it is difficult for 
business entities to absorb asymmetric shocks.
Some member states still may feel inclined 
to hold their heads in their hands and mutter 6
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pean bank closure agency with its own bank 
closure fund. Systemic banking crises would 
then, hopefully, be a thing of the past, and 
the vicious circle between banks and govern-
ment bonds would be broken. Savers would no 
longer have to be afraid of losing their savings, 
and taxpayers would no longer be alone when 
it comes to bearing liability for the risky deals 
of the banks. 
when thinking about the costs of bailing-out 
banks. They are unwilling to impose additional 
burdens on their citizens, especially in election 
years. And, indeed, it is unfair to be asked to 
pay for the faults of others. This is something 
that should be avoided if at all possible. But 
what is the point? If one has come to the conclu-
sion that there are vital reasons why the euro 
should be saved under any circumstances, then 
the bill has to be paid one day. 
Cyprus’s finance minister called the banking 
authority “a Christmas present for the whole of 
Europe.” Yet, it would be even better if we were 
going to be given the whole of the banking un-
ion by Easter. It is not out of the question: the 
proposals are on the table for a single Euro-
pean deposit insurance system that protects 
savers, and single rules for the restructuring 
and closure of banks including a new Euro-
A Vicious Circle
A vicious circle of bank debt, government debt, and the macroeconomic crisis
Source: German Council of Economic Experts © Bertelsmann Stiftung
Government bank rescue 
packages have negative impact 
on public ﬁnances
Economic slump leads 
to loan defaults
Cost-cutting and 
budget consolidation 
reduce economic growth
Dwindling tax revenues and
rising transfer payments 
have negative impact 
on public budgets
Decline in lending 
to companies reduces 
investment levels
Government debt default 
has negative impact on 
bank balance sheets 
and capitalization
Banking crisis
  Macro-
economic
crisis
Government
debt crisis7
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